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Eliminating the Exception? Lawrence v.
Texas and the Arguments for Extending the
Right to Marry to Same-Sex Couples
BY TYLER S. WHITrY*
I. INTRODUCTION
W hile matrimony has traditionally been a fundamental concept
in our society, the significance of a legally recognized
marriage was often ignored and forgotten. Such may no longer be the
case, however, as there has been a renewed level of interest of late in
both the institution of marriage and its definition. The right to marry has
been under the social microscope before, but never has it been so
magnified as during the debate concerning whether to recognize same-
sex marriages in the United States. Indeed, while hundreds of thousands
of troops continued to fight an unpopular war in the Middle East, it was
same-sex marriage which became one of the driving topics in the 2004
presidential debate.' Predictably, though, the debate achieved no
consensus or final resolution. While some sates have begun to
independently shape the definition of marriage through state
constitutional amendments, the debate will likely continue until it is
resolved on a national level, either by the United States Supreme Court
or by an amendment to the United States Constitution.
When considering the same-sex marriage debate, it is essential to be
clear about the core underlying principles: first, the right to marry has
enjoyed a clear and longstanding heritage in this country, both socially
and legally; and second, the recognition of same-sex marriage would not
involve the creation of a new fundamental right, but rather an extension
of the preexisting right to marry. Though both sides of this marriage
"controversy" have ardently and passionately argued their stances, both
(the opposition in particular) have failed to address or even recognize
this second concept. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,2 such passive ignorance may be difficult to avoid, as those that
oppose same-sex marriage may now find that their justifications for
denying the right to marry are in uncertain and troubled waters. As a
practical matter, Lawrence may eventually prove insignificant in the
J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky.
Stevenson Swanson, Same-Sex Marriage Leaping into Election; Issue Has
Hazards for All Candidates, CHI. TRI., Feb. 15, 2004, available at 2004 WL 69247940.
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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legal clashes that lie ahead, but it at least suggests that the Court is more
willing to recognize same-sex marriage now than ever before.
The eventual recognition of same-sex marriage is by no means a
certainty. At a minimum, it will require a multitude of social, ethical, and
legal considerations. Though all are necessary components to an
informed discussion of this issue, this note will focus principally on the
legal implications of Lawrence v. Texas. In no way does this discount the
importance of these other considerations; it simply highlights the fact
that same-sex couples have garnered their most substantial footing on
the legal front. Ultimately, the purpose of this note is to refresh the
arguments for same-sex marriage in light of the legal developments in
2003 and 2004. Primarily, this note will analyze the effects of the
Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas on the arguments for and
against same-sex marriage. Part II briefly points out the many benefits of
being legally married.3 Part III discusses the Supreme Court's general
recognition of the right to marry,4 and Part IV examines the almost
uniform ban on same-sex marriage in the United States.5 Part V is
devoted to the arguments in favor of recognizing same-sex marriage as a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.6 Part VI analyzes
whether any of the common justifications for prohibiting same-sex
marriage could withstand heightened scrutiny.7 Finally, Part VII
considers the legacy of such developments as the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's recognition of same-sex marriage in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,8 as well as the surge of
same-sex marriage ceremonies in San Francisco and elsewhere.9
II. THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
To fully understand why those that passionately support same-sex
marriage do so, one must understand the significance of a legal marriage.
The substantial role that marriage has traditionally played in Western
society is undeniable. The relevance of the marriage ceremony-more
importantly, the legal recognition of the rights and privileges of
marriage-extends far beyond the ritualistic and symbiotic union of two
individuals. In fact, a marriage is very closely comparable, from a legal
3 See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 40-102 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 103-139 and accompanying text.
8 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
9 See infra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
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standpoint, to a contractual relationship in which two individuals share a
great number of obligations to one another while at the same time
deriving a mutual benefit from the relationship. While the contract
allegory is somewhat dry and harsh, the legal and financial benefits
resulting from a lawful marriage are unquestionable.'
The list of "advantages" associated with the institution of marriage,
none of which are available to same-sex partners, is seemingly endless.l
The following excerpt details only a select few of the benefits of being
married:
Same-sex partners are excluded from insurance awards, social
security benefits, public pensions, worker's compensation, income tax
benefits, and estate tax benefits. They cannot contract to sue for
wrongful death of a spouse, to receive compensation given to families
of crime victims, or to be appointed conservator or guardian of an
invalid family member. Nor can they contract the right to make health
care decisions for a family member or even to visit a loved one in a
hospital or prison. Furthermore, exclusionary zoning laws, restrictive
statutory provisions, and narrow judicial constructions of the meaning
of "family" discriminate against same-sex couples in their efforts to
secure housing.
... Moreover, same-sex couples are excluded from employee family
health care, group insurance, discounted "family rates" in assorted
organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by the entirety. 2
Arguably the most recognizable area in which married couples are
afforded different treatment is in the realm of intestate inheritance and
the general protection provided to a surviving spouse. Whether in the
form of a personal exemption 13 or inheritance rights,14 the surviving
10 A detailed analysis of the extent of the benefits and burdens arising from marriage
is well beyond the scope of this note. For a summary analysis of these "benefits and
burdens," especially how they would relate to a homosexual couple, see David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1996).
1" For an extensive listing of over 1049 rights enjoyed by married couples, but
denied to same-sex couples as compiled in a 1997 GAO report, see http://
www.marriageequality.org/facts.php?page=1049 federal.
12 Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies Same-
Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379, 390 (2003).
13 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 391.030(1)(c) (Michie 2004)
(granting a $15,000 personal exemption which would otherwise be taken out of the gross
intestate estate).
14 See, e.g., § 392.020 (granting to the surviving spouse half of the decedent
spouse's surplus real and personal intestate estate).
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spouse is generally entitled to some portion of his or her deceased
spouse's intestate estate.. The same is not true with same-sex partners.
Same-sex partners could hypothetically live together for thirty years,
completely devoted -to one another and sharing almost every
characteristic of a married couple, and yet neither individual would
receive any portion of the other's estate if they were to die intestate.
Instead, they are driven to such measures as adopting one another in
order to inject themselves into the other's inheritance scheme. 5
"Because it is irrevocable, adult adoption is the most drastic of the many
legal strategies designed to circumvent the illegality of same-sex
marriage. Yet, as long as same-sex marriage is illegal, adoption is the
only solution that creates a bona fide family relationship .... ,,6
Marriage also includes intangible benefits. Though it is not often
mentioned alongside the list of tangible benefits denied to same-sex
couples, the ability for two individuals to commit themselves to one
another, especially in the eyes of the public, is a very real benefit. To
deny same-sex couples the right to marry is to publicly chastise their
relationship and can be "interpreted as denoting the inferiority"'17 of
homosexuals and same-sex partners. It is appropriate to assume that such
improper connotations should not be tolerated, and certainly should not
be enforced by state and local governments. Yet, that has been the reality
in the United States for some time.
Only Vermont, through its legislative recognition of civil unions, has
made a substantial effort to guarantee to same-sex partners the same
rights and responsibilities granted to heterosexual married couples.'
8
While Vermont has taken a positive step forward, no other state has even
come close. In fact, a number of states have even drastically regressed in
the most recent general election. Eleven states passed constitutional
marriage amendments to their respective constitutions to ban same-sex
marriage. 9 The conclusion to be drawn from these results is that a very
15 For a discussion of the pros and cons of adult adoption, see generally Gwendolyn
L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J.
FAm. L. 75 (1998).
16 Id. at 75.
17 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Brown was decided on equal
protection grounds, but the lesson provided by the Court is easily applicable here. The
majority decision recognized that separating a class of people has certain psychological
effects, and the same holds true when same-sex couples are denied a privilege enjoyed
by op osite-sex couples solely based on their chosen lifestyle. See id.
T See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002) (Vermont's Civil Union Law).
19 The states include Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon and Utah. Stevenson Swanson, Amendments to
Ban Practice Pass Handily in all 11 States, CtI. TRm., Nov. 3, 2004, at 8, available at
2004 WL 97456041.
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small portion of same-sex couples will enjoy the benefits of marriage.
There were approximately 594,391 same-sex households in the United
States as of 2000.20 Considering the brief list of marital rights and
benefits provided above, it is disheartening to think that some states will
deny these rights and benefits to well over a million people simply
because of a choice in lifestyle, or a mere sexual preference.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL "RIGHT" TO MARRY
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
2' and Fourteenth22
Amendments protect certain procedural and substantive liberties of
individuals.23 Like many constitutional doctrines, substantive due process
jurisprudence has undergone many changes over time. Since abandoning
its 1905 holding in Lochner v. New York, the Court has struggled to
define what rights are indeed protected under the Due Process Clause.24
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to marry
is in fact a fundamental, if not the most fundamental, right. In Griswold
v. Connecticut, arguably the Court's most famous decision regarding the
20 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2002 Special Report: Married-Couple and
Unmarried-Partner Households: 2000, 'available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003?ubs/censr-5.pdf.
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
22 U.S. CONS. amend. XIV, § 1.
23 The Court has not always been, nor is it today, in agreement as to what specific
substantive liberties are protected by the Due Process Clause. In fact, some justices refuse
to acknowledge any right as "fundamental" that is not "deeply rooted" in the text of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Connecticut's law as applied here is not forbidden by any provision of the Federal
Constitution as that Constitution was written .... "). However, the majority's decision in
Lawrence acknowledges the notion that there are unenumerated rights protected by the
Constitution. As Lawrence indicates, the extent of the actual liberties protected is always
in flux, albeit sometimes at an unhurried pace. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66
(discussing Supreme Court decisions that have recognized various rights which are not
expressly delineated in the Constitution, nor necessarily deeply rooted (i.e. the right to
have an abortion)).
1 24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 921
(1952). Although long discarded, the Lochner doctrine is arguably the most famous
doctrine in substantive due process jurisprudence. Under Lochner, the Supreme Court
essentially granted itself the power to review legislative enactments for reasonableness,
necessity, and arbitrariness (or, as some described, the power to be a "super-legislature").
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. Lochner was eroded and eventually abandoned by the Court,
in large part to preserve the validity of an influx of New Deal legislation. See generally
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2004-20051
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
right to privacy, Justice Douglas noted that the institution of marriage
was "a right of privacy [that is] older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system."25 Consequently, the
Supreme Court expressed its desire to protect that right. Whether it be a
divorcee who wishes to remarry but is delinquent on child support
26 2payments, or even prison inmates who wish to marry one another,27 the
Supreme Court has gone to great'lengths to protect the institution of
marriage from undue infringement.
The Court first acknowledged marriage as a fundamental right in
Loving v. Virginia.28 .The Court in Loving overturned the convictions of a
male Caucasian and an African-American female who were convicted
under a miscegenation statute that forbade interracial marriages. While
the bulk of the Court's opinion relied on the Equal Protection Clause,29
the Court went on to. hold that '"the [fundamental] freedom to marry or
not marry a person of another race resides with the individual and'cannot
be infringed by the State. 30 A decade later, the Supreme Court reiterated
that notion in Zablocki. v. Redhail, stating that the "freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'
The fight is no longer to convince the Court that marriage is a
fundamental right; rather, today's fight is whether a government can
deny that right on an arbitrary basis such as a couple's sexual orientation.
That particular basis is arbitrary indeed, for why is it that convicted
felons have a protected right to marry, yet law abiding homosexuals are
denied a legal recognition of their marriage?
IV. THE CURRENT PROHIBITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
With the possible exception of Massachusetts, the prohibition of
same-sex marriage is a legal certainty in the United States. Those in
favor of continuing this prohibition have put much effort into their cause;
the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") is a pertinent
25 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
26 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that a statute prohibiting
marriage to individuals who are delinquent in their child support payments violates their
right to marry).
27 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (ruling that i.nnmate marriage prohibition
was "not reasonably related" to any state interest).
28 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is ... fundamental to our
very existence and survival."):
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" 0Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
31 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
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example.32 The DOMA not only codified the federal definition of
marriage as the "legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, 33 but it also sought to give the states authority not to
recognize same-sex marriages, or other similar unions, even when valid
in other jurisdictions that do permit them. 4 While this latter provision
raises many unresolved constitutional issues regarding the Full Faith and
Credit Clause,35 it has already made a significant impact in the fight
against same-sex marriage. In fact, a large majority of states have
adopted "junior DOMAs" purporting to deny recognition of same-sex
unions from other jurisdictions.36
Certain jurisdictions, such as Vermont, have tried to appease same-
sex couples as a means of continuing the ban on same-sex marriage.
Civil unions are an example of this movement. They confer upon same-
sex couples many, if not all, of the benefits associated with marriage.
However, same-sex couples are still denied the enjoyment of a right that
is available to heterosexual couples. While civil unions are a step in the
right direction, they still permit an inference of inferiority based on
sexual orientation. These civil unions "continue[] to relegate same-sex
couples to a different status .... The history of our nation has demon-
strated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal. 37
32 Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 '(codified
as amended in scattered sections of 1 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
33 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004). This section is arguably the most controversial of the
DOMA. Many commentators suggest that the DOMA may in fact be invalid due to its
inconsistencies with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See e.g., MARK STRASSER,
LEGALLY WED: SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 127-58 (1997). The actual
statutory language states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.35 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5,36 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 402.005 (Michie 1999) ("one man, one woman" definition of
marriage); § 402.020 (prohibition of same-sex marriages); § 402.040(2) ("marriage
between members of the same sex is against Kentucky public'policy"); §402.045(l)-(2)
("A marriage between members of the same sex which occurs in another jurisdiction
shall be void in Kentucky" and "[a]ny rights granted by virtue of the marriage, or its
termination, shall be unenforceable in Kentucky courts.").
37 Opinions of the Supreme Court Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569
(Mass. 2004).
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In addition to DOMAs and the recognition of civil unions, the
prevention of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage can be seen
elsewhere. Recently, constitutional amendments became a popular means
of prohibiting same-sex marriage. In the general election of 2004, voters
in eleven states approved constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriages. While this is certainly significant at a state level, it is arguably
more significant in a federal sense because it adds to the preexisting
pressures on Congress for an analogous federal constitutional amend-
ment.38 President George W. Bush has even lent his support to such an
amendment, stating that "[m]arriage is a sacred institution between a
man and a woman. If activist judges insist on redefining marriage by
court order, the only alternative will be the constitutional process. We
must do what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of marriage. ,
39
A federal amendment would surely eliminate any constitutional
arguments for the recognition of same-sex marriage. Such a measure
would be drastic and damaging as a policy matter. When the trend has
been to make efforts to reduce discrimination against gays and lesbians,
an amendment such as this would not only curb such efforts, it may even
perpetuate discrimination.
V. THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT
A. What Does It Mean to Be "Fundamental"?
In classifying marriage as a fundamental right, one must be careful
not to overstate the extent of that right. Simply put, the current legal
status in the United States suggests that marriage is not a fundamental
right for everyone. It is true that there are a number of restrictions on
marriage besides the prohibition of same-sex marriage-for example,
there are prohibitions on incestuous marriages and marriages between
children and adults.40 However, the prohibition of same-sex marriage is
of particular curiosity because the sole ground for denying legal
38 See, e.g., H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). This proposal seeks to define marriage
in the United States as only between one man and one woman.
39 Rose Arce, Massachusetts Court Upholds Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (Feb. 4,
2004), available at http://www.cnn.com2004/LAW/02/04/gay.marriage/index.html.
(quoting President George W. Bush as he responded to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts's rejection of anything less than the right to marriage for same-sex
individuals).
40 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 402.010 (prohibiting incestuous marriages); § 402.020(0
(prohibiting marriage including an individual under the age of 16).
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recognition of a same-sex marriage is the sexual orientation of the
individuals. In essence, society, state legislatures, and judiciaries
specifically are able to "pick and choose the citizens [to whom will be
granted] the fundamental right to marry. ' 41
Much of the fight over the recognition of same-sex marriage, or any
right for that matter, as a fundamental right revolves around the meaning
of the word "fundamental." Such a classification is crucial because the
"Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they
are deemed to be 'fundamental rights' and that generally the government
cannot infringe them unless strict scrutiny is met; that is, the
government's action must be necessary to achieve a compelling
purpose., '42 It is true that fundamental rights enjoy certain protections
under the Due Process Clause, but that reveals nothing about how
fundamental rights are established.
B. Classifying a Right As "Fundamental"
The process of classifying a right that has not previously been
considered "fundamental" is not clearly defined. It is, however, typically
an uphill battle. The only certainty in these cases is that the Court must
undertake an objective analysis of the right, arising from its obligation to
"define the liberty of all, [and] not to mandate its own moral code. ' 'A3
The determination of a right as "fundamental" is, in some respects,
as much a constitutional interpretation question as it is a substantive due
process question.44 Interpretation is critical due to the fact that
"fundamental rights," in the vast majority of cases, are not mentioned
anywhere in the text of the Constitution. This notion of unenumerated
fundamental rights has sparked a sharp division between those who insist
that the Court must preserve the original intent of the Framers in
interpreting the Constitution, and those who suggest that the Court
should not be restrained by this original intent. 45 Those that argue the
latter (and this would almost necessarily include proponents of same-sex
marriage) insist that the "meaning and application of constitutional
41 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 123 (1996).
42 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 695 (2001).
43 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
44 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 765 (2d
ed. 2002) ("The constitutional interpretation debate ... has been primarily about how the
Court should decide what rights are fundamental .... ").
45 Id. at 17-19. (discussing the differences between "originalists" and "non-
originalists").
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provisions should evolve by interpretation..., [allowing] constitutional
interpretation to include norms and values not expressly intended by the
framers. ' 46 To say that the current Court does not consider original intent
to some extent would be inaccurate. Indeed, how both "history and
tradition" have treated a specific right dramatically influences many
current members of the Court. 7 Yet, the inquiry does not stop there.48
Neither original intent nor historical treatments of a right are
conclusive as to that right's ultimate fundamentality. The Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas to include homosexual activity as a
fundamentally privacy right exemplifies this very point. In writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that laws specifically targeting
same-sex individuals did not arise until the twentieth century. 49 The
implication was that, had a historical prohibition existed, as there has
been with same-sex marriage, there would be little weight left to an
argument for homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right. Kennedy
arguably overstates the significance of his point. Though homosexuals
were not specifically targeted until the twentieth century, there were
prohibitions against consensual sodomy, both between heterosexuals and
homosexuals, dating back to the sixteenth century.5 ° Only twenty years
ago the Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a
similar ban on consensual sodomy in Georgia.51 Yet, the Court over-
turned that precedent in Lawrence.
A multitude of factors weigh upon the Court in deciding which rights
are fundamental, but it cannot be said with certainty which factors will
be more persuasive than the others. Rather, it is understood that original
intent, history, and tradition may all play a role in the Court's decision
making, but the relative weight will vary as each "new" right is presented
to the Court.
46 Id. at 18. (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 765.
48 Proof that the Supreme Court does not always bind itself to the original intent of
the Framers is apparent in its handling of capital punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has consistently stressed that '.[t]he [8th] Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002) (emphasis added)
(quoting Trop v. Duiles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
49 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003) ("It was not until the 1970's that
any state singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution . .
50 Id. at 568.
51 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
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C. Same-Sex Marriage As a Fundamental Right
The argument for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage
requires a clear understanding of the issues. Marriage is, technically
speaking, already a fundamental right. The same-sex marriage argument
should, ideally, not be one in favor of recognizing a new right, but rather
one in favor of extending a preexisting right. "The issue is not '[w]hy
gay marriage?' but is instead '[w]hy not gay marriage?"'' 52 Nonetheless,
proponents of same-sex marriage will undoubtedly endure many of the
same obstacles that faced supporters of previously unrecognized rights.
In addition to procedural issues regarding how the argument in support
of same-sex marriage should be framed, substantive issues abound.
1. Original Intent
Original intent presents one of the most substantial obstacles for
proponents of same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage was certainly not
recognized at the time the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment were
ratified. Furthermore, both history and tradition seem to side with the
opponents of same-sex marriage. However, "[h]istory and tradition are
the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the . . .
inquiry.",53 If it were the ending point, then the Court's recognition that
the Equal Protection Clause protects women from gender discrimination
is also incorrect.5 4 To demonstrate, the Fourteenth Amendment was
largely, if not solely, enacted to protect former slaves from racial
discrimination.55 However, this did not prevent the Court in Craig v.
Boren, a case involving gender discrimination against males, from
explicitly applying a more stringent standard to gender-based
discrimination by the government, using the Fourteenth Amendment as
its vehicle.56 The Court cannot, and does not, hide behind a "static"
52 ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 128.
53 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (2003) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is mentioned purely to
demonstrate a point. Though the Equal Protection Clause is also a potential ground for
arguing the validity of same-sex marriage, this note focuses primarily on the Due Process
Clause.
55 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 13 n.46 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (stating that the equal protection clause was meant only to
protect racial minorities and never would be extended beyond)).
56 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1977) ("[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.").
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interpretation of the Constitution 57 and this has allowed the Constitution
to evolve over its existence through judicial interpretation."8 This
evolution should, in theory, mirror societal and moral evolution. To
borrow language from Justice Warren, the Constitution "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."
59
Can it candidly be said that a society that denies two individuals the
right to marry based upon their lifestyle choice or their sexual preference
is a maturing society that exhibits decency to all its citizens? The only
logical answer seems to be in the negative. There are a number of
reasons for such an answer, but one of the most persuasive is the
noticeable trend toward legalizing same-sex marriage in foreign
jurisdictions. For instance, both Belgium6 and Canada 6' have recognized
same-sex marriages. Similarly, significant domestic advancements have
also occurred. Courts in Alaska,62 Hawaii,63 Massachusetts, 64 and
Vermont65 have all held that a prohibition against same-sex marriage
violated their respective state constitutions. To get around these judicial
decisions, both Hawaii66 and Alaska67 amended their constitutions to
57 Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that the scope of the Eighth
Amendment is not static).
58 Even judicial review, the very doctrine granting the Supreme Court the power to
review and invalidate legislation that violates the Constitution, was a product of the
Supreme Court's interpretation. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-77(1803)
U Trop, 365 U.S. at 101 (discussing the meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
60 The Belgian Parliament enacted legislation on January 23, 2004, legalizing same-
sex marriage. The text of that law can be accessed at http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/
pdf/50/2165/50K216503.pdf (text only in French or Flemish); see generally AUDE
FIORINI, NEW BELGIUM LAW ON SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PIL IMPLICATIONS, 62
INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 1139-49 (2003).
61 See EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada, 2003 D.L.R. Lexis 105, *817 (B.C. Ct. App.
2003). For an extended listing of relevant cases, and the proposed act to legalize same-
sex marriage, see Rutgers Law Library-Newark, Same-Sex Marriage: A Selected
Biblioyraphy of the Legal Literature, at http://law-library.rutgers.edu/SSM.html.
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *6 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) ("today's decision finds a person's choice in life
partner to be a fundamental right").
63 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that there is no
fundamental right to'same-sex marriage, but its denial violates Equal Protection).
64 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) ("We
declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution.").
65 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) ("[W]e find a constitutional
obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, protection, and security that
Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples.").
6See HAW. CONST. art. I, § .23.
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include a more "traditional" definition of marriage. While the Vermont
legislature enacted a statute similarly defining marriage as between one
man and one woman,68 it did permit same-sex civil unions which grant
many of the same legal benefits as marriage.69 In addition, there have
lately been substantial efforts made to grant marriage licenses to same-
sex couples. These efforts have not been focused in one locale; they have
occurred in California, New Mexico, New York, Massachusetts, Oregon,
and Washington.7°
These developments, both foreign and domestic, are significant in
that they show that the societal perception of same-sex couples is
changing. While the majority of the public has generally remained
hostile to same-sex marriages, as evidenced by the recent amendments
passed in eleven states, the highest courts in four states have
acknowledged the constitutional difficulty with denying same-sex
marriages. These state court decisions, as well as the efforts of same-sex
couples to obtain marriage licenses, likely will not be ignored by the
Supreme Court. It is guaranteed that the fiercest opponents of same-sex
marriage have surely taken notice.7'
Though the state constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and
Vermont are not identical to the United States Constitution, nor is the
Supreme Court bound by the decision of any state court, these state court
opinions may be good indicators of how the Supreme Court would
respond if these issues were ever brought before it.
72
2. The "Deeply Rooted" Factor
Constitutional interpretation of substantive due process rights is, in a
generic sense, under a noticeable amount of tension. This tension
primarily arises from the Supreme Court's attempts to preserve the
67 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
68 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002).
69 See §§ 1202-1207.
70 Alan Cooperman & Dana Milbank, Gay Marriages Proliferate, as Do Arguments;
ConstitutionalAmendment Runs Into Doubts in Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A3.
71 Opponents have acknowledged that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is
nearer now than it has ever been. In response, websites arguing against same-sex
marriage have popped up at an astounding pace. One website in particular,
www.onemanonewoman.com, is devoted to attracting signatures for a petition to amend
the Constitution to prevent same-sex marriage. See LIBERTY ALLIANCE, PETITION OF
SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE ACT, available at http:/www.
onemanonewoman.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
72 In the meantime, tactics similar to those of the legislatures in Hawaii and Alaska
(constitutionally redefining marriage) are currently being employed by some members of
Congress.
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original intent of the Framers.while at the same time remaining cognizant
of the evolving social and moral norms. Despite such tension, some
principles have surfaced. Generally, "the Court has .. observed that the
[Substantive Due Process] Clause specially protects those fundamental
rights ,and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."73 Though same-sex marriage will lack such deep
roots, it is important to reiterate that history and tradition is "not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry. 74 Even so,
the lack of deep roots can, in part, be explained by the fact that "lesbians,
bisexuals, and gays have historically been subjected to discrimination. 75
This history of discrimination had the effect of preventing any notion of
same-sex marriage. from entering the "consciences of the people. 76
However, for those that suggest fundamental rights still must be deeply
rooted in history and tradition, they need not look any further than cases
such as Loving v. Virginia77 and Roe v. Wade"' to support the assertion
that even rights lacking deep roots have still been held to be
fundamental.
The recognition of the a woman's right to have an abortion is of
particular 'interest as it illustrates this tension between evolving social
norms and the original intent of the Framers. The first criminal ban on
abortion in the United States was enacted in Connecticut in 182 1.
79
Likewise, the Texas anti-abortion statute considered in Roe v. Wade had
originally been enacted in 1854 and remained in effect for well over one
hundred years before it was repealed by the Court in 1973.80 Yet, even
though abortion lacked deep roots, the Court still opined "that the right
of privacy, however based, [was] broad enough to cover the abortion
decision."'" This extension of the right of privacy indicated that the
73 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
74 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (citing County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
75 STRASSER, supra note 34, at 68 (citation omitted). For a documentary discussing
the history of discrimination targeting lesbians and gay men, see generally JONATHAN
KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (Thomas Y.
Crowell Co. 1976).
76 STRASSER, supra note 75, at 67-68.
77 Loving v. Virginia 338 U.S. 1 (1967). "[N]either history nor tradition could save a
law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78
(citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the outcome of Loving)).
78 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy in limited circumstances).79 1d. at 138.
I01d. at 119.
I' d. at 155.
[VOL. 93
ELIMINATING THE EXCEPTION?
Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause took. account evolving
societal standards and practices. Not only did abortion lack deep roots,
but it was extremely controversial at the time of Roe v. Wade. These
same features of the abortion debate are equally shared with the
arguments regarding same-sex marriage. One important feature of this
comparison is that both abortion and same-sex marriage involve an
extension of an already-established fundamental right. 2
3. Extension of the Existing Right to Marry
Proponents of same-sex marriage are not faced with the task of
persuading the Court to recognize a new right; they are merely arguing
for the Court to extend an existing, recognized right. Incidentally, the
same-sex relationship context is not the first time that a fundamental
right has been denied to homosexuals, yet guaranteed to others. In many
respects, these were the circumstances involved in Lawrence. Prior to
Lawrence, it seemed that the Supreme Court was in fact willing to treat
homosexuals differently regarding certain fundamental privacy rights.
The decision that Lawrence overruled, Bowers v. Hardwick, indicated
this very notion.8 3 The 1985 Bowers majority upheld a Georgia statute
criminalizing consensual sodomy. In so doing, the Court expressed its
unwillingness to announce that the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy was a fundamental right.84 While on its face the law targeted all
forms of sodomy, both between heterosexuals and homosexuals, the
Court's opinion demonstrated that the statute in question was directed
primarily at homosexuals. In fact, the basis for the majority's refusal
relied on "[p]roscriptions against that conduct [having] ancient roots, 85
and that there was "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
procreation ... and homosexual activity." 86 This language suggests that
homosexuals should not be permitted to enjoy certain rights because of
historical proscription, and because such "sexual deviance" serves no
"legitimate" end, such as procreation. One must remember that not all
heterosexual sexual activity is geared toward procreation, yet
"traditional" marriage is protected as a fundamental right. Why then is
82 Clearly, when dealing with same-sex marriage the right to marry must be
extended. With abortion, the Court in Roe v. Wade extended the right to privacy to
encompass a woman's right to an abortion. See id. at 115 ("(T]he right of privacy ... is
broad enough to cover the abortion decision.").
83 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
84 Id. at 192.
" Id. at 192.
86 Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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homosexuality 'singled out as distinct? Essentially, the only real answer is
that not all citizens are entitled to enjoy certain private rights enjoyed by
the masses. There was, as one commentator put it, a "homosexuality
exception" to certain privacy rights that were enjoyed by heterosexuals.8
7
The Lawrence decision, handed down in November 2003, has
seemingly abolished any exception as to sexual privacy rights that
Bowers may have created.88 Like Bowers, the Texas statute held un-
constitutional in Lawrence criminalized consensual sodomy among
adults; but unlike Bowers, the Texas statute explicitly targeted only
sodomy between same-sex individuals.8 9 The fact that the Texas statute
in Lawrence only targeted homosexuals tends to strengthen the argument
that the Court is becoming more and more receptive to challenges made
to laws that are solely restrictive of the rights of homosexuals. To be
sure, Lawrence does not stand for the proposition that homosexuals have
the right to marry. In fact, in Justice Kennedy's own words, "[this ruling]
does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."90 However, in
some respects, laws :forbidding marriage among same-sex couples are
similar to the Texas anti-sodomy statute. The main similarity is that the
only triggering element for the application of theses statutes is that the
couple is comprised of two individuals of the same sex.
While some similarities exist between the Texas anti-sodomy statute
and statutor prohibitions of same-sex marriage, there are also obvious
differences.9 ' The Texas statute carried with it criminal penalties for
engaging in same-sex sodomy, whereas statutes prohibiting same-sex
marriage do not. Nevertheless, this difference lies in mere form rather
than in substance. Penalties do not always have to be criminal in nature.
Indeed, same-sex marriage prohibitions have a very real penalty; they
deny the tangible and intangible benefits of the marriage relationship.
Surely this difference in penalties would not prevent the application of
Lawrence to challenges respecting prohibitions of same-sex marriage.
87 ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 134.
88 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.").
89 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits an offense
if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."),
repealed by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
90 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
91 The phrase "prohibitions of same-sex marriage" is a general one. It incorporates
both explicit prohibitions as well as statutes that explicitly define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman. The reason for such an incorporation is that these
restrictive definitions have the same effect of the explicit prohibitions in preventing
same-sex marriage.
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4. The Uncertain Effects of Removing the "Homosexuality Exception "
If one reads Lawrence to eliminate the "homosexuality exception" to
constitutionally protected privacy rights, what is there to stop the Court
from applying cases such as Loving v. Virginia92 to same-sex marriage?
The same arbitrary triggering elements were present in the miscegenation
statutes that forbade interracial marriage. Those statutes, which were
rendered unconstitutional by Loving, were triggered simply due to the
fact that a husband and wife happened have different skin colors. Loving
was a reflection of the time in which the case was decided. It also
reflected that the interpretation of the Constitution's guarantee of
substantive due process was not static. The prohibitions of mixed-race
marriages were rooted in a history and a tradition saturated with racist
overtones. Yet, despite such history and tradition, Loving ensured that
members of different races could marry with full assurance that they
would enjoy the many benefits and obligations enjoyed by other married
couples.
Even the institution of slavery was upheld at one point in the early
history of this country, only to be vehemently rejected years later.93
While the comparison between the prohibition of same-sex marriage and
slavery has many obvious differences, the process of validation was the
same for both. As one commentator suggests, the prohibition of same-
sex marriage is itself a form of "moral slavery." 94 "Moral slavery
condemns a structural injustice marked by two interlinked features: first,
its abridgement of the basic human rights of a class of persons, and
second, the rationalization of such abridgement on inadequate grounds
reflecting a history of unjust treatment (involving the dehumanization of
the group)."95 Like slavery at the time of its abolition, same-sex couples
are currently denied the right to marry for reasons rooted in a history of
unjust and unequal treatment. In fact, "several of the familiar ways in
which the constitutional evils of racism and sexism were constructed
(namely, the distortion of the public/private distinction, segregation,
anti-miscegenation) reasonably inform understanding of the
constitutional evil of homophobia." 96 This construction of the "evil of
homophobia" is something that the Court in Lawrence took note of in
92 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
93 See Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (the infamous "Dred Scott" decision),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII & XIV.
94 DAViD A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER,
RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 3 (1999).
95 id.
96 1d. at65.
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discussing the history behind the Bowers decision. The opinion states
that:
the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family .... The issue is whether the majority may use the
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code."
97
At some point in history, society deemed these individuals inferior or
evil, and it is against that backdrop that we maintain the current
prohibition.
There are notable differences between the argument against laws
targeting homosexual sodomy and same-sex marriage. One of those
differences can be found in the text of Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Lawrence. He noted that "[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting
the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4
enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct . . . [and] there is a
pattern of nonenforcement" in those states.98 This same societal trend
away from "criminalizing" homosexual activity, or at least activity with
which certain homosexuals are associated, cannot be seen in regard to
same sex-marriage. Yet only Massachusetts has acknowledged that
same-sex couples cannot be denied a legal marriage.99 While political
figures, such as Mayor Gavin Newsom of San Francisco,1  have
acknowledged as much, no other jurisdictions have reached this
conclusion. Despite this fact a trend is forming, such that several state
courts may be inclined to hear challenges to the prohibition of same-sex
marriage primarily due to the steadfast urging of same-sex marriage
advocates.
Whether the Supreme Court chooses to extend Lawrence to same-
sex marriage remains to be seen. However, Lawrence is still in its
infancy, and given the many legal developments in the United States one
can only assume that a case concerning same-sex marriage could reach
97 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
98 Id. at 559.
99 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004).
100 Letter from Gavin Newsome, Mayor of San Francisco, California, to Nancy
Alfaro, San Francisco County Clerk (February 10, 2004) (available at http://
news.findlaw.com/ legalnews/documents/index.html) (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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the country's highest court sooner rather than later. It is important to
recognize that a Supreme Court recognition of same-sex marriage as a
fundamental right does not necessarily rest on an extension of Lawrence.
While Lawrence does specifically deal with same-sex individuals, it
likely will not dictate the Court's opinion. Rather, the Court will, and
must, consider all areas of its substantive due process jurisprudence. It is
in that analysis that cases such as Loving v. Virginial l and Roe v.
Wade"2 must be considered, and both of these cases bode well for
advocates of same-sex marriage.
VI. CAN A STATE JUSTIFY A BAN ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?
Convincing the Supreme Court that a same-sex marriage should be
considered as fundamental as marriage between heterosexual persons is
only the beginning. Technically speaking, even fundamental consti-
tutional rights can be infringed upon by state laws if supported by a
compelling governmental interest. "When a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot
be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests
and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."'0 3
There is little doubt that states have "significantly interfered" with
same-sex individuals' right to marry. Following the lead of the Defense
of Marriage Act,'04 several states have, through their respective
legislatures, defined marriage as the union between one man and one
woman. 05 Some states, Kentucky among them, have gone even further
and enacted statutes that impose an outright ban on same-sex
marriages. 10 6 Such significant interference may still be constitutionally
valid if the state is able to provide the proper justification. There are a
number of possible justifications a state may offer to defend denying
same-sex individuals the right to marry. 17 While justifications such as
"preserving the sanctity of marriage" are not likely to hold up under their
own weight, other justifications are not so easily overcome.
101 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
.2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
"4 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
"' See, e.g., K.R.S. § 402.005 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) ("The word 'marriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman . .
"' § 402.020.
107 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 137-43.
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A. Interest in Fostering Procreation
The first possible justification could be the state's interest in
fostering procreation. As one commentator stated, "the right to marriage
is determined not solely by commitments arising from love as such, but
by 'the natural teleology of the body."" 08 However, this justification
suffers multiple flaws, and. is not a "publicly reasonable basis for law."' 9
The most important and obvious flaw is that cases such as Roe v. Wade' " 0
and even Griswold v. Connecticut,"' wherein the Supreme Court
invalidated an anti-contraception law, stand for the proposition that the
procreation justification will not necessarily salvage a law that infringes
upon the right of intimate privacy. More directly, language from the
majority decision in Lawrence v. Texas seems completely to reject the
procreation argument. The pertinent part of the opinion reads:
"individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring,
are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
'"12
Secondly, the procreation rationale is both too narrow and under-
inclusive. It is narrow in that "it would demean a married couple were it
to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse."'" 3 Furthermore, laws based upon such a justification are
inherently under-inclusive since they do not reach all individuals who
are similarly situated. Specifically speaking, should impotent hetero-
sexuals, heterosexual postmenopausal women, and even fertile
heterosexual couples with no desire to procreate, be denied a legal
marriage? 14 If the only justification is procreation, the logical answer
must certainly be yes. Put another way, "[i]f the natural teleology of the
body made any sense as a basis for public law, such childlessness [of
heterosexual couples] as much violates the natural teleology of the body
as that of a homosexual couple."
' 15
108 See RiCHARDs, supra note 94, at 160-61.
'09 Id. at 161.110 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
113 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
114 ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 96.
115 RICHARDS, supra note 94, at 161.
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B. Interest in Protecting Children
A second commonly asserted state justification is the suitability of a
same-sex couple to raise children. The main premise of the justification
is that "a child is best parented by its biological parents living in a single
household."'" 6 This justification is inadequate and overly broad. It
essentially assumes that, in any situation, the biological parents are
inherently better equipped to raise their child than, for instance, an
adopting couple.' 7 Such an argument undermines the very purpose of
adoption: to get the child into the best hands possible. In addition, studies
comparing children raised in same-sex households with children raised
in households consisting of one biological parent conclude that a higher
percentage of children in the latter households have psychiatric
troubles. ' 8 The only real risk associated with children in a same-sex
household is the way the same-sex couple chooses to raise the child in
light of "societal homophobia.' '19 In essence, the risk is that a child
could potentially be shielded from many experiences and interactions
that are thought to be "essential" to his or her development, all because
of the potential negative reception of the fact that his or her parents are
gay. Thus, one commentator suggests that "legal same-sex marriage
would help legitimize the couples' interaction with the world, especially
where children are concerned.'
120
C. Interest in Maintaining the Status Quo
A third justification resonates with simplicity, and it likely
underlying many laws forbidding same-sex marriage. It is best described
by one commentator as a "definitional objection.' 2' Simply put,
marriage has always been the union of man and woman, and any other
definition is simply "oxymoronic.' 22 While seemingly a weak argument,
116 ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 139.
17 Id. at 140 ("there are plenty of bad biological parents and good adoptive or
stepparents").
II Id. at 139-40. The studies, conducted by Susan Golombok, compared twenty-
seven families headed by lesbians with twenty-seven families headed by single
heterosexual mothers. "The researchers found no differences between the children in the
two groups along most dimensions, including sex role behavior, gender security, and the
ability to form and maintain peer relationships." Id.
19 Mark Townsend, Mental Health Issues and Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE
ROAD To SAME SEX-SEX MARRIAGE 89, 94 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds.,
1998 2° Id. at 95.
121 ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 89.
12 Id.
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the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Jones v. Hallahan refused to
acknowledge a constitutional claim for recognition of a same-sex
marriage for this very reason. The court stated that "marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been
presented with no authority to the contrary."1 2 3 Not only is such
reasoning suspect and self-perpetuating, but history tells us that this type
of reasoning, absent something else, will not be treated favorably by the
Court. The best proof can be found in cases such as Loving v. Virginia,
where the Court reversed the "definitional" prohibition of mixed-race
marriages.1 2 4 "For most of American history different-race marriages
were not acceptable, but that was no argument to perpetuate this
discrimination once our society rejected the racist assumptions of that
exclusion., 12' A justification should not become compelling simply by
the passage of time; rather it should be anchored by rational
underpinnings of its own.
Of course, likely before this transition can occur, our society must
reject the discriminatory assumptions that are the basis of the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage. A poll conducted in January 2004
suggests that the majority of Americans still oppose same-sex
marriage, 126 yet developments in cases such as Lawrence and Goodridge
suggest that the legal treatment of homosexuals may be abandoning such
opposition.
D. Interest in Preventing "Social Disorder"
One final commonly offered state justification is that the recognition
of same-sex marriage could lead to a "massive disruption of the current
social order"'127 and could lead to other "social ills." 128 In fact, Justice
Scalia relied on this very justification in writing his dissent in Lawrence
v. Texas. Scalia expressed concern that the majority opinion in Lawrence
would open the door to invalidating "[s]tate laws against bigamy[,] ...
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity.' '129 Scalia reasoned that all of these acts are "traditional
123 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
124 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
125 ESKRIDGE, Supra note 41, at 91.
126 William M. Welch, Kerry May Face GOP Attacks on Gay Marriage, USA
TODAY, Feb. 6, 2004, at 2A ("A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll... found that 53% of
Americans oppose a law allowing gay couples to marry.").
127 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
128 Charlene Gomes, The Need for Full Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, THE
HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 15, 19.
129 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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'moral[]' offenses ' 130 and that it would be impossible to make a
distinction between homosexuality and those offenses. 131 What is most
disturbing about Scalia's dissent is not really the fact that he makes such
"apocalyptic predictions"; 3 2 rather, it is that he views homosexuality as a
moral offense on the same level as bestiality and obscenity.
The "social disorder" justification is primarily flawed due to the fact
that homosexuality is treated as an offense. Such a concept is eerily
reminiscent of the United States eugenics movement that targeted
"'degenerate' offenders"'133 like homosexuals for sterilization. Homo-
sexuality is not an illness, 3 4 and yet Scalia and others that oppose
Lawrence and same-sex marriage seek to treat it as such: The extension
of marriage to include same-sex relationships is not going to inject a
disease into society. If anything, it will raise awareness and stress
equality, much like desegregation and the civil rights movement
emphasized the plight of African Americans.
The opposing argument that is offered most often is that the Court
cannot recognize same-sex marriage without recognizing practices like
polygamy. 135 This "slippery slope"136 argument fails to recognize the
difference in the state justifications that have been offered for banning
same-sex marriage and those that can be offered for banning polygamy
and incest. Specifically, there are compelling interests that can be offered
to sustain a prohibition of polygamy that cannot be offered with regard to
same-sex marriages. Many of the laws applicable to a married couple are
designed for only two individuals. The state has an administrative
interest in preserving such a body of law. For instance, imagine a male
with multiple wives who becomes incapacitated due to a violent car
accident. Which of the spouses is to have the decision-making
responsibility? 37 The state has a compelling interest in such instances to
have quick decisions that are not marred by disagreements and infighting
among the concerned wives. Furthermore, "there would . be rivalry
1301d.
131 id.
132 Gomes, supra note 128, at 19.
133 Peter Kwan, Querying a Queer Spain Under Franco, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 989,
994 n. 16 (2000). For a discussion of other "treatments" that were used to "cure"
homosexuality, see KATZ, supra note 75, at 197-205.
134 See Kwan, supra note 133, at 993 n. 16 ("It was not until 1973 that the American
Psychiatric Association finally removed homosexuality as a mental illness from its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders.").
135 See generally ESKR1DGE, supra note 41, at 144-52 (describing the "slippery
slope" argument for recognizing same-sex marriages).
161d. at 144.
'3 7 See id at 149.
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between . [spouses] . . . [for] spousal benefits.' 38 Consider the
difficulties in administering divorce proceedings and monitoring support
payments. Arguably, the most drastic effect of allowing polygamous
marriages is that the entire inheritance scheme of the states would have
to be amended to take multiple spouses into account.
Assuming that the Supreme Court were to recognize same-sex
marriage as a protected fundamental right, it would be inconsistent with
substantive due process jurisprudence to permit bans on same-sex
marriage due to the absence of compelling governmental justifications.
Justifications based on the lack of procreation and childrearing
capabilities of same-sex individuals, the two most commonly asserted
justifications, are both archaic and juvenile. Furthermore, actual case
law, Roe v. Wade, supports the notion that procreation is not a
compelling justification.'3 In the end, the real fight is in convincing the
Court to extend the existing fundamental right of marriage to same-sex
couples. From there, a court may be unlikely to deny this right based on
one of these common justifications.
VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Since the decision was handed down in Lawrence v. Texas, there
have been a number of developments that warrant discussion. While the
specifics of these developments are outside the scope of this note, they
are relevant to the legal arguments that have been made. The first major
development is the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's holding in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that it was in violation of the
Massachusetts Constitution to deny a same-sex couple a marriage
license. 140 Subsequent to its decision in Goodridge, the court refused a
potential compromise that would extend to same-sex couples the right to
civil unions. 141 In an opinion addressed to the Massachusetts Senate
holding that anything less than full marriage rights was unconstitutional,
four justices stated that "the proposed [civil union] law by its express
terms forbids same-sex couples [sic] entry into civil marriage, [which]
continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status . . . .The
history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever,
138 id.
139 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) ("Limiting
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples
violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law protected by the
Massachusetts Constitution.").
141 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2003).
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equal.', 142 Currently, Massachusetts is the only state that allows same-sex
couples to marry legally. However, the significance of this decision is
that it also places the future of same-sex marriage in the hands of the
state legislature. Like Hawaii and Vermont before it, Massachusetts
could potentially amend its constitution to define marriage as only
between heterosexual couples, thus putting an end to the state
constitutional arguments in favor of the recognition of same-sex
marriage. There will undoubtedly be fierce debate over this topic, but the
ultimate outcome is clouded with uncertainty.
The second major development involved instances where marriage
licenses were issued to same-sex couples in contravention of laws and
policies banning same-sex marriage. San Francisco Mayor Gavin
Newsom provided the best example of this activism. On February 10,
2004, Newsom addressed a letter to the San Francisco County Clerk
requesting the clerk to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
43
The events that followed garnered national attention. Thousands of
same-sex couples lined up in front of the courthouse seeking licenses.
The California Supreme Court has since halted this practice until
arguments can be heard on cases pending before it, but not before Mayor
Newsom's actions brought this issue before the national and international
public. Though these instances mark a significant step for same-sex
couples, statutory rights must be extended in order for there to be a
lasting effect.
The significance of these developments is twofold. First, they mark
an increased awareness and tolerance of same-sex couples by society.
There have arguably been more advances in civil rights for same-sex
couples in 2003 than in any year prior. Second, these developments have
all occurred at the state and local level, which could potentially lead to
issues regarding the junior DOMAs and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 144 If jurisdictions such as Massachusetts recognize same-sex
marriages, can other jurisdictions refuse to recognize these marriages and
remain in compliance with the demands of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause? This is an issue that may in fact be played out in upcoming legal
battles. However, there may be a simpler and more uniform solution
available. While granting marriage licenses is a responsibility relegated
to the states, infringement upon a fundamental right, such as marriage, is
something that must be resolved by the Supreme Court.
142 Id. at 569.
143 Letter from Gavin Newsom to Nancy Alfaro, supra note 100.
144 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Same-sex couples have never enjoyed the right to a legal marriage.
Yet, the Supreme Court has held on a consistent basis that marriage is
indeed a fundamental right protected under the Constitution. 145 While the
prohibition of same-sex marriage has in some respects been ingrained
into the minds of the public, upon close examination there is little or no
satisfactory rationale for maintaining such a prohibition. What was once
considered a "homosexuality exception" to certain privacy rights is
arguably no more under Lawrence v. Texas. It is true that the historical
and traditional treatment of same-sex couples in this country does not
support the recognition of the right for same-sex individuals to marry;
however, it is inequitable to foreclose this issue on historical grounds,
given that the prohibition rests on a history of unequal treatment. To rely
exclusively on history would mean that cases such as Roe v. Wade,
Loving v. Virginia, and even Lawrence v. Texas were incorrectly
decided.
The ultimate significance that Lawrence will play in the fight to
extend the right to marriage to same-sex couples is indeterminable. It is
mere speculation to say that, under Lawrence, the Court has no
alternative but to acknowledge same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right. It has been almost two years since Lawrence was decided, and the
proposition remains to be tested by the Supreme Court. However, with
the developments across the United States and the ever increasing
attention that same-sex couples are gathering domestically and abroad, it
will be interesting to see just how long it will be until the Supreme Court
is forced to render a decision on the matter. If and when that time does
come, same-sex couples have a very persuasive argument to make. As a
matter of precedent, the Court may have no other choice than to
recognize same-sex marriage. As a matter of equality, it seems that the
Court should have no other choice.
145 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
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